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COMPLETE LIST OF ALL PARTIES
Petitioner Ivory Homes is unaware of any parties other than those identified in the
caption of this Opening Brief of Petitioner.
1.

The Petitioner, Ivory Homes, Ltd., shall be referred to herein as "Ivory
Homes."

2.

The Respondent, Utah State Tax Commission, shall be referred to herein as
the "Commission."
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This appeal is from the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final Decision
(the "Final Decision") of the Utah State Tax Commission (the "Commission") issued on
August 4,2009 and attached hereto as Addendum l.1 This Court has jurisdiction
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(e)(ii).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the Commission violate the "cardinal rule of statutory construction"

prohibiting the inference of substantive terms into the statutory text when it held that
Ivory Homes' liability for sales tax on delivery charges was established by the terms of
the "invoices that were contemporaneous with those trainsactions," even though the statute
(a) only requires itemization of delivery charges within "an invoice, bill or sale, or similar
document," and (b) does not restrict the time within which such documentation must be
provided in order to identify delivery charges.
Standard of review: "As questions of law, we review the Tax Commission's
interpretations of the various statutory provisions implicated in this matter for correctness,
according the Tax Commission's interpretations no deference." ExxonMobil Corp. v.
Utah State Tax Comm% 2003 UT 53,111, 86 P.3d 706, 709; Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-

1

The Final Decision is set forth in the record at R. 111 through R. 115. All
citations to the Final Decision contained herein will be made to the specific pages of the
Record.
1
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403 (appellate court shall grant relief when it determines that the agency has erroneously
interpreted or applied the law).
2.

Did the Commission err when it relied on the Seller's invoices to determine

that delivery charges were subject to sales tax because title to the ready-mixed concrete
passed after delivery had occurred even though: (a) the basis for this analysis (Utah
Admin. Code R865-19S-71 (2004)) has been repealed; (b) the Utah Supreme Court has
rejected sellers' invoices as evidence of intent to pass title; and (c) the Court has

(21)

(a) "Delivery charge" means a charge:
(i)
by a seller of:
(A) tangible personal property; or
(B) services; and
(ii)
for preparation and delivery of the tangible personal
property or services described in Subsection (21 )(a)(i)
to a location designated by the purchaser.
(b)
"Delivery charge" includes a charge for the following:
(i)
transportation;
(ii)
shipping;
(iii) postage;
(iv) handling;
(v)
crating; or
(vi) packing,

acknowledged industry custom and practice recognizing that title to ready-mixed concrete
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(21) (2005).
passes prior to delivery?
(a)

interpretations of the various statutory provisions implicated in this matter for correctness,

If a taxpayer pays a tax, penalty, or interest more than once or
the commission erroneously receives, collects, or computes
any tax, penalty, or interest, including an overpayment
described in Subsection (l)(c), the commission shall:

according the Tax Commission's interpretations no deference." ExxonMobil, 2003 UT 53

(i)

credit the amount of tax, penalty, or interest paid by the
taxpayer against any amounts of tax, penalties, or
interest the taxpayer owes; and

(ii)

refund any balance to the taxpayer or the taxpayer's
successors, administrators, executors, or assigns.

Standard of review: "As questions of law, we review the Tax Commission's

H 11,86 P.3d at 709; Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403.
DETERMINATIVE LAW
The relevant statutes which govern the outcome of this appeal are as follows:
(b)
(c)

"Purchase price" and "sales price" do not include:
(ii) the following if separately stated on an invoice, bill of
sale, or similar document provided to the purchaser:...
(D) a delivery charge;

Except as provided in Subsections (2)(c) and (d) or Section
19-2-124, a taxpayer shall file a claim with the commission to
obtain a refund or credit under this Subsection (2) within
three years from the day on which the taxpayer overpaid the
tax, penalty, or interest.

Utah Code Aim. § 59-12-110(2) (2005).

Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(6l)(c) (2005) (emphasis added).

3

2
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Conclusions of Law, and Final Decision denying Petitioner's refund request R. 111-115.

Nature of the Case

Petitioner filed its Petition for Review on August 24, 2009.

This is an appeal of an administrative proceeding before the Commission

C.

Commission's Disposition of the AdroinistrativeJProceeding
1.

concerning a statutory notice issued to Petitioner Ivory Homes by the Auditing Division

According to the Commission, the failure of the Seller to separately itemize

of the Utah State Tax Commission (the "Division") which denied Ivory Homes* request

delivery charges in the initial invoice resulted in the sale of a "delivered product" which

for a sales tax refund.

could not be converted "into sales of goods plus delivery charges." R. 115 f 6.

B.

2.

Course ofProceedings
On August 28, 200S, Ivory Homes filed a written request for a refund of Utah sales

stated on an invoice, bill of sale, or similar document provided to the purchaser t ,,, at the

taxes with the Division for sales taxes paid on delivery charges from July 5. 2005 through

t-

August 9, 2008. R. I I I . By statutory notice dated November 26. 2008, the Division

py, -.

denied the refund request for the tax period July 2005 to April 2008,2 Id. Petitioner

R. 115.

appealed the statutory notice to the Commission, R. 1. A formal hearing was held on
April 22, 2009, R. 111. On August 4,2009, the Commission issued its Findings of Fact,

The Commission held that when delivery charges were not "'separately

'• ransacnop. occurs, those charges "heearne part of a transaction for delivered
men were] at the time of the Taxpayer's refund request, completed lrarlsactions.,*

3.

Although the Commission acknowledged that taxpayers have "the right and

ability to correct errors in tax filinp," R. 114, it ruled that "[t]he provisions of Utah law
allowing for the correction of errors do not allow the Taxpayer to change completed

2

The Commission observed that the Statutory Notice identified the tax period as
being from July 2005 to April 2008, rather than the full period for which Ivory Homes
requested a refund which period ended August 9,2008. R. 111 % 4. The Division has
never responded to Ivory Homes' refund request for the remaining period of May 2008
through August 9,2008. R. 115 % 7. The Commission held that, despite the fact that
there is no pending appeal for the May 1,2008 to August 9,2008 time period, the
outcome of this appeal should govern that remaining tax period. Id. Although there is no
material difference in the facts for that time period, this Court does not have the
jurisdiction to directly resolve the refund request for the May 1,2008 to August 9,2008
time period because there has been no denial of that request, nor is there a pending
appeal. However, Ivory Homes anticipates that the Court's decision in this appeal will be
applied to the pending refund request by the Division.

transactions for delivered goods into sales of goods plus delivery charges.** R. 115 f 6.
4.

The Commission refused to consider Ivory Homes* undisputed evidence

separating and identifying the delivery charges because il concluded that "[tjhe best
evidence of the intent of the Taxpayer and the Supplier in their transactions come from
invoices that were contemporaneous with those transactions." R. 114,

5

4
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5.

The Commission rejected Ivory Homes' characterization of the original

6.

The Seller subsequently provided Ivory Homes with detailed documentation

invoices as containing error on the grounds that Ivory Homes "did not present evidence to

breaking out the portions of the charges that were for "concrete materials" and the

indicate that, at the time of the transactions, the Taxpayer or the Supplier intended to enter

portions that were for "delivery charges." See Record at Hearing Exhibit No. 5.3

into transactions for products other than delivered concrete as documented in the original

7.

On August 28,2008, Ivory Homes submitted a refund request to the

invoices." Id.

Commission for the sales taxes which the Seller erroneously collected from Ivory Homes

D.

Statement of Relevant Facts

on non-taxable delivery charges for ready-mixed concrete products from July 5,2005 to

1.

August9,2008. R. 111.

Ivory Homes is a building contractor in the State of Utah which is primarily

8.

engaged in residential construction. R. 9.
2.

In the course of conducting its construction business, Ivory Homes

Ivory Homes also submitted a copy of the Seller's report that identified the

delivery charges included, but not separately identified, in the original invoices, and

purchased ready-mixed concrete and related sand and aggregate products from Jack B.

identified the sales taxes which the Seller had erroneously collected on those delivery

Parson Companies (the "Seller"). R. 111 ? 5, 112 H 6.

charges. R. 112.

3.

When the Seller delivered its products to Ivory Homes during the period at

9.

On November 26,2008, the Division issued a Statutory Notice to Ivory

issue, it provided invoices to Ivory Homes which included delivery charges, but did not

Homes denying its request for a refund of sales and use tax for the period of July 2005

separately identity such charges. R. 112^6.

through April 2008. R. 111.

4.

In those initial invoices, the Seller calculated sales tax on the total invoiced

Ivory Homes filed a timely Petition for Reconsideration and a Formal

Hearing was held before the Commission on April 22,2009. R. 111.

amount which included the delivery charges. Id.
5.

10.

Ivory Homes paid sales tax on the full invoiced amount, including delivery

11.

At the hearing, the Seller provided evidence identifying the amounts of the

delivery charges that had been included in the lump sum amounts reported on the Seller's

charges. Id.

3
This documentation is contained in the record, but has not been numbered. It is
tabbed as Exhibit 5 to the hearing exhibits attached at the end of the numbered record.

6

7
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dginal invoices. R. 1121 7. That evidence included corrected invoices which
,eparately Identified the nontaxable delivery charges and calculated sales tax only on the

Qccmred, the transaction is a "completed transaction for delivered goods" which cannot
be converted into "sales of goods plus delivery charges.** R. 115 % 6.
SUMMARY

axable sales thereby reducing Ivory Homes' sales tax liability. R. Hearing Exhibits 3

This appeal concerns an issue of statutory interpretation. Under Utah law, delivery
ind4.
12.

The evidence also included spreadsheets setting forth the delivery charges

for each transaction, as well as identifying the amount of sales tax paid by Ivory Homes
on those delivery charges for each transaction during the relevant time period. R. Hearing

charges which, prior lo 2005, were defined as an element of the taxable "purchase price"
or "sales price," are no longer included in the sales tax base. Therefore, this Court should
interpret the relevant provisions of the Sales and Use Tax Act "liberally in favor of the
taxpayer." County Bd. of Equal of Wasatch Co. v, Utah State Tax Comm %n and the

Exhibit 5.
13.

There is no dispute regarding the accuracy of the documentation provided

In prior cases, when the Division has found that individuals or entities had

made errors in the preparation of lax returns or sales documents, it has allowed those
parties to correct errors through refund requests or amended rclums subject to applicable

-

,-M/I. -

interpretation applicable to exemptions does not apply because Ivory Homes is not relying
on a statutory exemption.
When Ivory Homes purchased ready-mixed concrete from its supplier, the supplier
included delivery charges in the total retail price and collected sales tax from Ivory

Utah law such as statutes of limitations. R. 1121 11.
15.

,.,

Tax Comm'n, 779 P.2d 1131, 1132 (Utah 1989). The moic icatrictive ini^ ^

by the Seller.4
14.

Strawberry Water Users Ass % 944 P.2d 370 (1997), quvuny

On August 4, 2009, the Commission issued its Final Decision in which it

held that Utah law does not allow Ivory Homes to request a refund by obtaining

Homes on the concrete and the delivery charges. R. 112. When Ivory Homes discovered
the error, it filed a timely refund request and supported that request with documentation
which separately identified the delivery charges on which Ivory Homes had paid sales tax.

corrections of the Seller's errors in the original invoices because, once delivery has
Id. The Commission refused to consider the documentation of delivery charges, finding
instead that the initial invoices were 'Ihe best evidence of the intent of the Taxpayer and
4
The Commission did not make a specific finding that the documentation was
u-e-s^ied. However, the Division never disputed or challenged Ivory Homes' evidence
cf delivery charges and the amount of sales tax paid thereon.

the Supplier." I t 114. According to the Commission, the Siguier's failure to separately

9

8
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identify delivery charges in the original invoices, converted those charges to part of the

invoices which were contemporaneous with the sales also ignores the Utah Supreme

"purchase price" of "delivered concrete." R. 114-115.

Court's declaration that, even under the Rule 71 analysis, invoices represent the unilateral

This conclusion constitutes reversible error for two reasons. First, the

intent of the seller and are not indicative of the purchaser's intent. Id. at 893. Even if

Commission's focus on the initial invoices as establishing the sales tax liability of Ivory

passage of title analysis were relevant, the Utah Supreme Court has indicated its

Homes ignores a "cardinal rule of statutory construction [] that courts are not to infer

willingness to follow industry custom which recognizes that title to ready-mixed concrete

substantive terms into the text that are not already there." Berrett v. Purser & Edwards,

passes before delivery occurs due to the unique nature of the product. Id.

876 P.2d 367,370 (Utah 1994). The statute which requires separate identification of

The collection of sales tax on non-segregated delivery charges occurs, not because

delivery charges does not require that such identification be set forth in the initial invoice

the taxable product is converted to a "taxable delivered product," but because the failure

nor does it prohibit subsequent corrections to that invoice. The Commission has

to segregate delivery charges simply makes it difficult to determine the correct amount of

acknowledged that "taxpayers have the right and the ability to correct errors in tax

sales tax on the taxable product. Corrected documentation easily remedies this difficulty

filings." R. 114. A purchaser should be able to obtain a corrected invoice or other

and, when submitted in a timely manner, should be deemed sufficient to identify the

documentation which segregates delivery charges, just as a purchaser would be entitled to

correct taxable amount and obtain a refund under the laws of this state.

obtain corrected documentation when the sales price is overstated by the seller and sales

I.

tax is overcollected. The Commission's rejection of Ivory Homes' documentation of

THE COMMISSION ERRED WHEN IT IGNORED A CARDINAL RULE
OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION AND INFERRED SUBSTANTIVE
TERMS INTO THE APPLICABLE STATUTE.

delivery charges is an impermissibly narrow interpretation of a taxing provision and

Under Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(6 l)(c) (2005), delivery charges are not

imposes restrictions which cannot be found in the statute.

considered to be part of the taxable "purchase price" or "sales price" so long as those

Second, the Commission's focus on the parties' intent at the time of the
transactions is based on passage of title analysis which was only relevant under an

charges are "separately stated on an invoice, bill of sale, or similar document provided to
the purchaser."5 In determining the meaning of the statute, the Court must first look to

administrative rule which is no longer in effect. Hales Sand & Gravel v. Audit Div, of
State Tax Comm % 842 P.2d 887 (Utah 1992). The Commission's reliance on the

5
That particular statutory provision is now set forth at Utah Code Ann. § 59-12102(82)(c) (2009).

10
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the plain language of the statute. ExxonMobil, 2003 UT 53 H 14, 86 P.3d at 710. Because

on an invoice, bill of sale, or similar document provided to the purchaser." However, it

this is a tax imposition statute rather than an exemption provision, any ambiguities within

does not require that the "document provided to the purchaser" have been created

the statute must be liberally interpreted in favor of the taxpayer. Id

contemporaneously with the sales transaction, nor does it preclude corrective

Furthermore, "[a] cardinal rule of statutory construction is that courts are not to

documentation. The Commission's rejection of the evidence of delivery charges violates

infer substantive terms into the text that are not already there. Rather, the interpretation

the "cardinal rule of statutory construction [] that courts are not to infer substantive terms

must be based on the language used, and the court has no power to rewrite the statute to

into the text that are not already there." Berrett, 876 P.2d at 370.

conform to an intention not expressed." Berrett, 876 P.2d at 370.

It would have been quite simple for the Legislature to require separate

In this case, the statute does not require the separate identification of delivery

identification of delivery charges in the "first invoice" or the "initial invoice." However,

charges in initial invoices. Nor does it preclude submission of corrected invoices or other

there is no such requirement in the applicable statute. The absence of such language is in

"similar documents" to verify delivery charges. The Commission's inference of such

stark contrast with just such a requirement in Ohio law. In Giant Tiger Drugs, Inc. v.

requirements is contrary to the "cardinal rule of statutory construction" and is grounds for

Kosydar, Tax Comm >, 43 Ohio St. 2d 103,330 N.E. 2d 917 (1975), the Ohio Supreme

reversal. Id.

Court held that the purchaser was not entitled to a refund for sales tax paid on labor

A.

The Statute Does Not Require Separate Identification of Delivery
Charges in the Initial "Invoice. Bill of Sale, or Similar Document
Provided to the Purchaser."

There is no dispute that the initial invoices included delivery charges and that

charges which the vendor had not separately identified in the initial invoices as required
by law. The applicable statute specifically required that" '[sjuch separation must appear
in the sales agreement or on the initial invoice or initial billing rendered by the vendor to

Ivory Homes paid sales tax on such charges. However, when Ivory Homes attempted to

the consumer.'" Id, 330 N.E.2d at 919, quoting R.C. 5739.01(H) (italics in original,

comply with statutory requirements by documenting delivery charges, the Commission

emphasis added); see also Spray Wax Car Wash v. Collins, Tax Commr., 46 Ohio St. 164,

rejected that documentation because it was not the initial invoice which was provided to

346 N.E.2d 696 (1976) (Service charges were taxable because they were not separately

Ivory Homes at the time that the transactions had taken place. The statute on which Ivory

identified in "initial invoice or initial billing" as specifically required by statute.).

Homes bases its refund request clearly requires that delivery charges be "separately stated

13
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Before the Ohio statute was amended to impose the "first invoice" or the "initial

Commissioner to determine the correct tax and to enable the seller to make accurate

invoice" requirement, Ohio law required separate identification of non-taxable or exempt

returns. Thus, the court concluded that the seller's books of account, which contained a

charges, but did not specifically require that identification of such charges be set forth in

breakdown of the charges, "sufficiently complied with the act." Id., 102 N.E.2d at 245.

the vendor's "initial billing." Under that earlier version of the law, "price" did not include

In St. Francis Hospital Ass'nv. Bowers, Tax Commr., 99 Ohio App. 133, 131

"consideration received for labor or services . . . if the consideration for such services is

N.E.2d 624 (1954), the Ohio Supreme Court held that the hospital's failure to bill patients

separately stated from the consideration received for the tangible personal property

separately for taxable services and exempt medications or other supplies did not make the

transferred in the retail sale." Roberts v. dander, Tax Commr, 156 Ohio St. 247, 249,

entire bill subject to sales tax. Once again, the Court observed that "the purposes to be

102 N.E.2d 242, 243 (1951) (quoting Section 5546-1, General Code). Consequently, in

served in making the separation of charges are to enable the Tax Commissioner to

cases decided prior to the amendment, the court had held that the separate identification

determine and assess the tax and to enable the vendor to make his tax return to the state

of services was not required to be set forth in the initial invoice.

and claim his exception by keeping copies of his invoices or by keeping books of account

For example, in Roberts v. Glander9 the vendor/upholster was audited and assessed

reflecting the breakdown of the charges." The Court held the statutory requirement that

sales tax for labor charges which had not been separately identified on the invoices

charges be separately identified could be satisfied by available hospital records "from

provided to the customers. The Tax Commissioner upheld the assessment because

which specific charges could have been determined." 131 N.E.2d at 626.

consideration received for labor was not "separately stated" from consideration for

The Utah statute specifically permits delivery charges to be separately identified in

materials used in upholstery jobs. On review, the Ohio Supreme Court examined the

"an invoice, bill of sale, or similar document provided to the purchaser." Utah Code Ann.

statute and held that "nowhere in the act is it stipulated how or in what manner the

§ 59-12-102(6 l)(c)(ii). By inferring a requirement that the delivery charges must be

consideration for services and that for materials shall be 'separately stated.*" 102 N.E.2d

identified by the seller's initial invoice, the Commission ignores the "cardinal rule of

at 244. The court concluded that the purpose of the statutory requirement did not concern

statutory construction . . . that courts are not to infer substantive terms into the text that

the purchaser inasmuch as "he ha[d] no obligation to compute, or make a return of the tax

are not already there." Berrett, 876 P.2d at 370.

to the state." Id. Instead, the requirement was established to enable the Tax

15
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B.

The Plain Language of the Statute Allows the Taxpayer to Separately
Identify Delivery Charges Using Documents Other Than Invoices.

Id
It strains reason to suggest that the invoices establish Ivory Homes "intention" to

The Commission's decision also completely disregarded the statutory
pay sales tax on charges which, by law, are not subject to sales tax. Even if Ivory Homes
acknowledgment that separate itemization of delivery charges can occur in documents
wanted to pay sales tax on delivery charges, that desire would not be sufficient to create
other than invoices. Because the statute at issue is not an exemption provision, it must be
sales tax liability. Ivory Homes would still be entitled to a refund under Utah law.
construed "liberally in favor of the taxpayer." ExxonMobil, 2003 UT 53 \ 19, 86 P.3d
Moreover, this Court has already held that sales invoices are not evidence of a
at 711.
purchaser's intent. In Hales Sand & Gravel, 842 P.2d at 893, the Utah Supreme Court
The statute at issue permits separate identification of delivery charges using an
held that the seller's purchase orders and invoices were irrelevant to the determination of
"invoice, bill of sale, or similar document provided to the purchaser." Utah Code Ann.
whether delivery charges were subject to sales tax because the unilateral subjective intent
§ 59-12-102(6 l)(c)(ii). Under the Commission's interpretation of the law, the initial
of a seller could not bind the purchaser:
invoice, unilaterally prepared by the vendor, represents the "best evidence" of the
purchaser's intention and irrevocably establishes sales tax liability:
The best evidence of the intent of the Taxpayer and the Supplier in their
transactions comes from invoices that were contemporaneous with those
transactions
Because the transactions were as the parties intended them
at the time, tax on delivery charges not separately listed on invoices would
be the correct tax rather than an overpayment of tax.
R. 114. The Commission found the invoices so compelling that it refused to acknowledge

The invoices and purchase orders [the seller] submitted may be firm
evidence of [the seller's] own intent to pass title at point of shipment;
however, without more, they do not provide an explicit agreement by the
customers to take title at the point of shipment
[Unilateral subjective
intent does not prove explicit agreement between the parties to pass title at
the point of shipment
Id at 893.
The Commission's refusal to accept alternative documentation as specifically

or consider subsequent, undisputed evidence submitted by the seller which identified the

permitted by the statute is also inconsistent with its acceptance of alternative

non-taxable delivery charges:

documentation in several other instances. For example, in Petitioner v. Customer Service

[T]he Taxpayer did not present evidence to indicate that, at the time of the
transactions, the Taxpayer or the Supplier intended to enter into transactions
for products other than delivered concrete as documented in the original
invoices from the Supplier to the Taxpayer.

Division, Appeal 97-J238, the taxpayer had paid sales tax on a lump sum invoice for
engineering services. The taxpayer filed a refund claim asserting that some of those
engineering services had not been subject to sales tax. The Commission agreed and
17
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allowed the parties to "provide a breakdown of the lump sum into its separate parts" so

(emphasis added). Effective December 19,2000, Rule 80 was amended to allow printers,

that the taxpayer would only have to pay sales taxes on the portions of the invoice which

to purchase pre-press materials tax free "if the printer's invoice, or other written material

were taxable. Findings of Fact, Conclusions ofLaw\ and FinalDecision, Appeal No. 97-

provided to the purchaser, states that reusable pre-press materials are included with the

1238 (02/26/1999) (attached hereto as Addendum 2).

purchase." R865-19S-80.2.C (2009) (emphasis added). The Commission applied the

In another appeal, the Division had assessed sales taxes on exempt installation

former Rule 80 to purchases before December 19,2000, and held that the petitioner was

charges because the taxpayer had not complied with Utah Admin. Code R865-19-51S.1E

liable for sales tax because its invoices did not contain the statement required by Rule 80.

which required the seller to separately identify installation labor charges in the invoice.

For the period after the rule change, the petitioner claimed that the bid sheets provided the

Some of the petitioner's invoices separately identified installation labor, while other labor

requisite notice by separately identifying the pre-press materials. However, the

charges were not separately identified on the invoices. The Commission allowed the

Commission held that adequate notice had not occurred because the bid sheets did not

petitioner to provide evidence of the non-segregated installation charges at the time of

specify that the customers were purchasing the materials. Nevertheless, the Commission

hearing and held that this evidence was sufficient to avail petitioner of the statutory

allowed the petitioner to submit evidence at the hearing to supplement those bid sheets

exemption. Informal Decision, Appeal No. 87-1161 (8/25/1988) (attached hereto as

with testimony demonstrating that certain customers knew they were purchasing pre-press

Addendum 3).

materials. The Commission concluded that the requirements of Rule 80 were satisfied by

In Appeal No. 04-0900, the Division had issued a deficiency assessment assessing
sales tax on pre-press materials which the petitioner/printer insisted it had resold to its
customers. Order, Appeal No. 04-0900 (Feb. 8, 2005) (attached hereto as Addendum 4).

the bid sheets when the customers affirmed their understanding that they were purchasing
pre-press materials.
It is important to note that Rule 80 concerned the application of an exemption,

Until December 19, 2000, Rule 80 had permitted printers to purchase reusable pre-press

rather than a tax imposition provision. Therefore, the Commission applied the more

materials tax-free, subject to the requirement that "[t]he printer's invoice must contain a

restrictive rule of strict construction. However, even with the strict construction, the

statement on its face, that states that reusable pre-press materials associated with that

Commission recognized that Rule 80 did not require that the notice to the purchaser be set

transaction are included with the purchase." Utah Admin. Code R865-19S-80 (2000)

forth in the invoice. Accordingly, the Commission allowed the petitioner to rely on

18
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written materials, other than the invoices, and to provide evidence to support its claim that

Commission's refusal to accept the corrective documentation means that sales tax liability

the customers understood they were purchasing the pre-press materials.

for delivery charges is irrevocably triggered by the failure of the seller to separately

In this case, the Commission acknowledged that "[t]he Supplier appeared at

identify those charges on the first invoice delivered to the purchaser. This places the

hearing and provided evidence as to what would have been the amounts of the delivery

taxpayer at a serious disadvantage. The taxpayer should be able to request a corrected

charges if they had been separately identified on the Supplier's invoices." R. 112 ^ 7.

invoice from the seller as evidence that the seller collected and remitted sales tax on items

This undisputed evidence complies with specific statutory requirements because it

that were not subject to tax. If the Commission is correct in its assertion, then a seller's

constitutes "similar documentation]" as "an invoice, [or] bill of sale."6

invoice which erroneously records the sale of ierj items when only one item was

C.

The Statute Does Not Restrict the Time Frame in Which the "Invoice.
Bill of Sale, or Similar Document" Separately Identifying the Delivery
Charge Must Be "Provided to the Purchaser."

Under Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-110(2)(a), Ivory Homes has a statutory right to a

purchased, would render a purchaser legally obligated to pay sales tax for all ten items.
Yet no one would seriously question the purchaser's right to obtain a corrected invoice or
other appropriate documentation so that it does not incur a tax burden as a result of the

refund for the overpayment of taxes within three years of the date on which those taxes

seller's error. When a seller fails to separate delivery charges from the other taxable

were overpaid. However, the Commission's decision effectively deprives Ivory Homes

charges, the delivery charges should not be taxable purely as a consequence of the seller's

and all other taxpayers of their statutory right to a refund of sales taxes paid on delivery

error. Surely the Legislature did not intend that a taxpayer's right to recover erroneously

charges any time the seller neglects to itemize those charges in the initial invoice and

collected sales taxes could be so easily thwarted by a seller's mistake.
The Commission's own rule recognizes that a "portion of the selling price may not

collects sales tax on those charges.
The statute which requires separate identification of delivery charges does not
establish a time frame during which such documentation must be provided. The

be subject to sales or use tax." Utah Admin. Code R865-19S-27.C (2005). This
acknowledgment means that a selling price is not determinative of whether all
components of that price are subject to sales tax. A taxpayer has therightto submit

6

If there were any ambiguity regarding what kind of material constitutes "similar
documentation," then, because the provision in question is a tax imposition statute, the
statute must be construed "liberally in favor of the taxpayer." ExxonMobil, 2003 UT 53
H14,86P.3dat710.

evidence identifying the varied components of the sales price as well as their differing tax
treatments.
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314 (1929), the Oregon Supreme Court held that corrected invoices submitted more than

THE COMMISSION ERRED WHEN IT RELIED ON PASSAGE OF TITLE
ANALYSIS TO CONCLUDE THAT DELIVERY CHARGES ARE
SUBJECT TO SALES TAX.

one year after the sales transactions were sufficient evidence of the taxpayer'srightto a

The Commission ruled that, because the initial invoices provided by the supplier

In Oregon-Washington Railroad & Navigation Co. v. Hoss, 128 Ore. 347,274 P.

IL

refund. The court noted that the statute "requirefd] that the affidavit for a refund must be

did not separately identify delivery charges, the transactions at issue in this case were

accompanied by the 'original invoice.'" The court rejected the defendant's claim that this

transactions for "delivered goods" rather than transactions for goods plus non-taxable

"referfred] to thefirstinvoice," stating, "it is clear the word 'original' as there employed

delivery charges. R.115 ^| 5. Notably, the Commission does not cite to a single statute,

is used in contradistinction to a copy and not in reference to time." Id. at 353.

administrative rule, or any other legal precedent to support its conclusion that the failure •

The statute which permits separate identification of delivery charges on "an

to separately identify delivery charges in the initial invoice converts such charges to a

invoice, bill of sale, or similar document," does not establish a time frame within which

permanent part of the "sales price."7 Inasmuch as there was no statutory support for the

such document must be provided. If the Commission's ruling is upheld, a purchaser

Commission's conclusion, the Commission instead relied on the passage of title test to

would not be permitted to request a new "invoice, bill of sale, or similar document"

conclude that delivery charges were part of the taxable purchase price. However, as a

which corrects that error-whether that request was made with one hour, one week, or one

result of changes to Utah law in 2005, the passage of title test is no longer relevant to the

year after the initial invoice was received by the purchaser. The only appropriate

determination of whether delivery charges are subject to sales tax.

limitation as to when such documentation can be provided is the three year limitations

The use of the passage of title test to determine whether delivery charges are

period set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-110(2)(a). The Commission's inference of a

subject to sales tax had its genesis in Rule 71 of the Utah Administrative Code. Hales

requirement that the documentation of delivery charges must occur at the time of the

Sand & Gravel, 842 P.2d at 891. In Hales Sand <fc Gravel, the vendor ("Hales") had

original sale effectively and illegally "rewritefs] the statute to conform to an intention not

contested a deficiency assessment requiring Hales to pay sales tax on transportation costs

expressed." Berrett, 876 P.2d at 370.

incurred in the delivery of building materials to its customers. The Court rejected Hales'
7

Under the plain language of applicable law, the fact that delivery charges were .
not itemized, does not convert them to something other than "delivery charges." Utah
Code Ann. § 59-12-102(21) (2005).
22
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argument that it was entitled to the sales tax exemption for delivery by common carrier.
However, the Court concluded that the inclusion of delivery charges in the sales tax base

(b)"Purchase price" and "sales price" include:
(iv) a delivery charge;

depended on where passage of title occurred. The Court specifically relied on Rule 71 of

Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(57) (2004). However, effective July 1,2005, the

the Utah Administrative Code as providing the test to determine whether delivery charges

Legislature removed subsection (iv) from the definition of "purchase price" and "sales

were part of the purchase price:

price," thereby eliminating "a delivery charge" as a specific element of price. The

The transportation charges are taxable if they are incurred before the transfer
of title because this increases the total selling price; transportation charges
are not taxable if they are incurred after the passage of title because they are
not part of the taxed sales transaction. While the text of the sales tax statute
does not mention such a test, see id. § 59-12-103, this court has interpreted
the predecessor statute as hinging taxability on the passage of title. See
Whitehill Sand & Gravel Co. v. State Tax Comm % 106 Utah 469, 472, 150
R2d 370, 371 (1944); see also Ford J. Twaits Co. v. Utah State Tax
Comm % 106 Utah 343,348, 148 P.2d 343, 345 (1944). In fact, the
Commission has promulgated a rule adopting the passage-of-title test for
fixing the moment for determining the tax. See Utah Admin. R. 865-1971S.

amended statute further explains that '"purchase price' and 'sales price' do not include [a
delivery charge] if separately stated on an invoice, bill of sale, or similar document
provided to the purchaser." Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(6 l)(c)(ii)(D) (emphasis
added). At the same time, the Commission repealed Rule 71-the very rule which
"adoptfed] the passage-of-title test for fixing the moment for determining the tax." Hales,
842 P.2d at 891. The amendment deleting delivery charges as a component of the
"purchase price" as well as the repeal of Rule 71 left no basis under Utah law for the

Id, 842 P.2d at 891 (emphasis added). Although the Court explained that the explicit
Commission or this Court to use passage of title analysis to include delivery charges in a
agreement between the parties regarding the transfer of title could be established by
purchase price.
written agreement, the Court rejected invoices and purchase orders as evidence of the
Notwithstanding these significant changes in Utah law, the Commission utilized
purchaser's intent to take title at the point of shipment. Id. at 893("[U]nilateral subjective
the obsolete passage of title test to conclude that Ivory Homes had purchased a "delivered
intent does not prove explicit agreement between the parties to pass title at the point of
product" and, therefore, owed sales tax on all charges, including delivery charges.
shipment.").
R. 114-115. The Commission's decision rests in large part on its opinion that the seller's
Subsequent to the Hales Sand & Gravel decision, Utah law was amended to
invoices reflect the purchaser's intent, a conclusion flatly rejected by this Court in Hales
specifically include "delivery charges" within the definition of "purchase price" and
Sand & Gravel. The Commission's erroneous application of the passage of title test, as
"sales price":
25
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well as its misplaced reliance on the invoices unilaterally prepared by the seller, is

title at point of shipment; however, without more, they do not prove an explicit agreement

evidenced by the following statements:
•

"[T]he Taxpayer did not present evidence to indicate that, at the time of the
transactions, the Taxpayer or the Supplier intended to enter into
transactions for products other than delivered concrete as documented in the
original invoices from the Supplier to the Taxpayer. R. 114 (emphasis
added).

•

•

•

•

•

"invoices and purchase orders . . . may be firm evidence of [the seller's] intent to pass

The best evidence of the intent of the Taxpayer and the Supplier in their
transactions come from invoices that were contemporaneous with those
transactions. Id. (emphasis added).
The Taxpayer has not provided any contract that would indicate that the
terms of the transactions were as reflected in those invoices. Id. (emphasis
added).
Because the transactions were as the parties intended them at the time, tax
on delivery charges not separately listed on the invoices would be the
correct tax rather than an overpayment of tax. Id. (emphasis added).
Transactions/or the times at issue in this case were, at the time of the
Taxpayer's refund request, completed transactions. R. 115 \ 5 (emphasis
added).
The provisions of Utah law allowing for the correction of errors do not
allow the Taxpayer to change completed transactions for delivered goods
into sales of goods plus delivery charges. R. 115^6 (emphasis added).

The definition of "delivery charges" and the exclusion of such charges from the
sales tax base does not depend on the parties' intention at the time the original
transactions occur. Intention was only relevant under the application of repealed Rule 71,

by the customers to take title at the point of shipment." Hales Sand& Gravel, 842 P.2d at
893. Thus, Ivory Homes' intent cannot be established by invoices unilaterally prepared
by one of its suppliers. The Commission's focus on the original invoices as establishing
the parties' intention would bind the purchaser to errors contained in the original sales
document. The law is not so rigid as to prohibit a purchaserfromobtaining corrective
documentation from suppliers of taxable tangible property.
Finally, even if passage of title were a relevant consideration in this matter, the
Utah Supreme Court has indicated its willingness to follow the generally recognized
industry custom that, when the product sold was ready-mixed concrete, title passed prior
to delivery. In Hales Sand & Gravel, the Court acknowledged that, "[b]ecause of readymix concrete's short lifespan, industry custom and practice recognize that title passes
when the ingredients are mixed." 842 P.2d at 893. Therefore, even under the law in
effect prior to July 1,2005, this Court would have recognized that title to the ready-mixed
concrete would have transferred to Ivory Homes prior to delivery and, therefore, delivery
charges were not considered part of the "purchase price" or "sales price."
Utah law requires itemization of delivery charges simply because, when the

to establish whether the parties intended for title to pass prior to or after delivery had

portion of the invoice attributable to non-taxable delivery charges has not been specified,

occurred. Furthermore, even if intent were relevant, the Hales Court explained that

the correct purchase price which is subject to sales and use tax remains unclear. In an
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ibundance of caution, sales tax is collected on the entire amount. This does not mean,
however, that delivery charges are part of the sales tax base. Indeed, it is clear, based on
the omission of "delivery charge" from the definition of "purchase price** and "sales
price," that the Legislature intends that delivery charges not be subject to sales tax.
The Commission acknowledged that the invoices prepared by the Supplier at the

Except as provided in Subsections (2)(c) and (d) or Section
19-2-124, a taxpayer shall file a claim with the commission to
obtain a refund or credit under this Subsection (2) within
three years from the day on which the taxpayer overpaid the
tax, penalty, or interest.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-110(2) (2005).
The Commission acknowledged that "Utah taxpayers have the right and the ability

time of purchase Included, but did not separately identify, delivery charges and that, as a

to correct errors in tax filings." R. 114. However, the Commission held that this relief

consequence, Ivory Homes paid sales tax on non-iaxable deK?-* rharge- Because "a

was not available to Ivory Homes stating, "[t]he provisions of Utah law allowing for the

delivery charge" is not part of the purchase price, when a taxpayer obtains documentation

correction of errors do not allow the Taxpayer to change completed transactions for

separately identifying such charges and files a timely refund request, the taxpayer is

delivered goods into sales of goods plus delivery charges." R. 115 % 6.
As explained in the foregoing section, the Commissions characterization of ivory

entitled to a refund under Utah iaw.
III.

UNDER UTAH LAW, IVORY HOMES IS ENTITLED TO A REFUND OF
SALES TAXES PAID ON DELIVERY CHARGES.

Homes* purchases as being "transactions for delivered goods*' is based on obsolete
passage of title analysis. Thus, the Commission's conclusion that Ivory Homes would be

The law which allows a taxpayer to obtain a refund of its overpayments of tax
altering the nature of its transactions is incorrect. Furthermore, there is no basis for the
provides as follows:
Commission to conclude that Ivory Homes did not pay sales tax on "delivery charges."
(a)

If a taxpayer pays a tax, penalty, or interest more than once or
the commission erroneously receives, collects, or computes
any tax, penalty, or interest, including an overpayment
described in Subsection (l)(c), the commission shall:

shipping, postage, handling, crating, or packing." Utah Code Ann § 59-!2-*02f2i • ^ s

(i)

Commission even acknowledged that this appeal concerns "delivery charges ior reariv-

(11)

credit the amount of tax, penalty, or interest paid by the
taxpayer against any amounts of tax, penalties, or
interest the taxpayer owes; and
refund any balance to the taxpayer or the taxpayer's
successors, administrators, executors, or assigns.

Utah law clearly defines "delivery charges" as charges for ''transportation,

mixed concrete products," R. 111 H 5 (emphasis added). It also found that the Supplier's
invoices neglected to "separately identifyfl delivery charges." R. 112 U 6. The Supplier
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presented uncontroverted evidence of the delivery charges. There is no dispute that the

separately identify the amount of the non-taxable delivery charges, then, according to the

prices reflected in the original invoices included non-taxable "delivery charges."

Commission's interpretation, the purchaser would be forever barred from requesting a

Ivory Homes* overpayments of sales tax occurred as a direct result of the seller's
invoicing practices. Because the seller neglected to separately identify the delivery

refund.
In Harper Investments, Inc. v. Auditing Div., Utah State Tax Comm 7i, 868 P.2d

charges, the seller collected sales tax on those non-taxable charges from Ivory Homes and

813 (Utah 1994), the Utah Supreme Court held that sales tax should not have been

remitted those taxes to the Commission. The Commission has refused to return those

assessed when it was based on documentation which erroneously reflected that a taxable

overcharges to the taxpayer even though there is no dispute that Ivory Homes paid taxes

transaction had occurred. An accountant for Harper had recorded certain sales contracts

on delivery charges, nor is there any dispute regarding the amount of the overpayment.

as belonging to the subsidiary Harper Sand and Gravel, even though they had actually

In Roberts v. Glander, the Ohio court explained that the requirement that

been assigned to Harper Contracting. Each time material was delivered by Harper

consideration paid for services be "separately stated'* on the invoice was not a

Contracting to the contracting customers, the books reflected a sale from Harper Sand and

requirement established for the purchaser "as he has no obligation to compute, or make a

Gravel to Harper Contracting. After the Commission audited Harper's books, it issued a

return of the tax to the state.*' 102 N.E.2d at 244. Instead, the requirement was intended

deficiency assessment against Harper for failure to pay sales tax on intra-unit sales.

to "enable the Tax Commissioner to determine and assess the tax and to enable the seller

Harper petitioned for redetermination and, although the Commission recognized that the

to make his tax return to the state." Id. Similarly, the requirement in Utah law that sellers

contracts had been '"mistakenly assigned'" to Harper Sand and Gravel, it affirmed the

"keep records of their sales and exemptions is to prevent tax evasion and tax fraud."

sales tax assessment. Id., at 816. Harper appealed to the Utah Supreme Court which

Tummurru Trades v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 802 P.2d 715, 718 (Utah 1990). This

recognized that the identifications of the transactions as sales were the "result of an

purpose is not furthered by penalizing the purchaser when the seller mistakenly includes

indisputably good faith error by the accountant." The Court held that "accounting records

delivery charges in the retail price set forth in the invoice.

'are no more than evidential, being neither indispensable nor conclusive. The decision

The seller is the party who knows what its delivery costs are and is the party who
prepares and issues the invoice. If the seller issues the original invoice and does not

must rest upon the actual facts." Id. The Court held that "the Commission [could] not
assess a sales tax on those nonexistent transactions."
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CONCLUSION

The invoices which were contemporaneous with the transactions at issue In this
appeal are likewise "no more than evidential, being neither indispensable nor conclusive."

Ivory Homes respectfully requests that this Court give effect to the plain language

Inasmuch as Ivory Homes has provided documentation of delivery charges, and has

of Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(61) (2005) and find that the documentation provided by

provided evidence that the first invoices contained delivery charges and that sales tax was

the Supplier which correctly identifies delivery charges sufficiently complies with

erroneously collected thereon, Ivory Homes is entitled to a refund of the sales tax

statutory requirements. Inasmuch as there is no factual dispute regarding the accuracy of

collected on those non-taxable charges.

the Supplier's calculation of delivery charges or the amount of sales tax which Ivory

Clearly the Commission has the right to iudit sales tax records and impose sales
taxes in excess of amounts reflected by vendor invoices when it concludes that the
original invoices contain errors. The Commission is not bound by the restrictions it seeks

Homes paid on non-taxable delivery charges, Ivory Homes respectfully requests this
C o n »c reverse the Commission's decision.
DATED this ^

/ day of February, 2010.

to impose on Ivory Hyines. For example, if a seller does not collect sales tax because it

WOOD CRAPO LLC

believes a purchase is exempt, the Commission has the right to audit the sale and impose
sales tax if it believes the seller's characterization of that sale was incorrect. If the
Commission is correct In its assertion that the sales price is the price for the goods when

ividJ.CrapoCJ
David
J. Crap
Attorneys for Petitioner

title transfers, then the Commission would -c- have ihe -ight to question the original
documentation. Just as the Commission can recalculate tax liabilities and assess sales tax
deficiencies, so too should a taxpayer be permitted to provide documentation of another
party's error to support its own refund request. The Legislature has provided a three year
period of limitations for sales tax refunds and Ivory Homes' refund request does not
extend beyond this three-year period authorized by the Legislature. Utah Code Ann,
§59-12-110 (2Kb).
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Mr. David Crapo, Attorney for Ivory Homes
Mr. Shane Hintze, Controller for Ivory Homes
Ms. Susan Barnum, Assistant Attorney General
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission for a Formal Hearing on April 22, 2009.
On the basis of the evidence and testimony presented at the hearing, the Tax Commission makes its;
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. On August 28,2008, Petitioner Ivory Homes (the "Taxpayer"), acting through its representative,
made a written refund request for Utah sales taxes to Respondent Taxpayer Services Division of the Utah
State Tax Commission (the "Division").
2. The Taxpayer's refund request included invoices from July 5, 2005 to August 9, 2008.
3. On November 26,2008, the Division issued a Statutory Notice in which it denied the Taxpayers
refund request,
4. In its Statutory Notice, the Division identified tax periods from July 2005 to April 2008, The
parties did not address the difference between the April 2008 ending date in the Statutory Notice and the
August 9,2008 ending date in the refund request from the Taxpayer.
5. At issue in the Taxpayer's refund request are delivery charges for ready-mixed concrete products

®

from Jack Parsons Company, a supplier of, among other things, ready mixed concrete (the "Supplier").
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(I) A tax is imposed on the purchaser as provided in this part for amounts paid or
charged for the following transactions:
(a) retail sales of tangible personal property made within the state;

6. For ready-mixed concrete and related sand and aggregate products ("Products") that the Supplier
delivered to the Taxpayer during the periods at issue, the Supplier generally provided invoices to the
Taxpayer showing a single price for Products without separately identifying delivery charges. The Supplier's
invoices generally included tax on the entire amount of the purchase and the Taxpayer paid sales tax as

2. Utah Code Annotated Section 59-12-102(72)(2008) defines the terms "purchase price" and "sates

invoiced.
7. The Supplier's accounting system allowed for the tracking of delivery charges as a separate item
from the cost of the Products themselves. The Supplier appeared at hearing and provided evidence as to what
would have been the amounts of the delivery charges if they had been separately identified on the Supplier's
invoices.
8. The Division denied the Taxpayer's request for sales tax on the amounts that the Supplier later
identified as delivery charges. It acknowledged that delivery charges are not always subject to sales tax. The
Division denied the Taxpayer's refund request on the basis of its determination that the transaction, as
concluded between the parties, was for delivered goods rather than for goods plus separate delivery charges.
9. The Taxpayer acknowledged that, with rare exceptions, invoices for Products from the Supplier
reflected a single charge for delivered Products. However, the Taxpayer maintains that even though delivery
charges were not separately identified on invoices, the Supplier and the Taxpayer have the ability to correct
invoices that were in error. The Taxpayer relies on Utah State Tax Commission Private Letter Ruling 06-013
(the "PLR") for the proposition that delivery charges on the Products are not taxable.
10. The Supplier provided evidence that while sales of ready-mixed concrete products without

price," in pertinent part, as follows:
(72Xa) "Purchase price*' and "sales price" mean the total amount of consideration:
(i) valued in money; and
(ii) for which tangible personal property or services are:
(A) sold;
(B) leased; or
(C) rented.
(b) "Purchase price" and "sales price" include:
(i) the seller's cost of the tangible personal property or services sold;
(ii) expenses of the seller, including:
(A) the cost of materials used;
(B)a labor cost;
(C) a service cost;
(D) interest;
(E) a loss;
(F) the cost of transportation to the seller; or
(G) a tax imposed on the seller; or
(iii) a charge by the seller for any service necessary to complete the sale.
(c) "Purchase price" and "sales price" do not include:
(ii) the following if separately stated on an invoice, bill of sale, or similar
document provided to the purchaser:

delivery are infrequent, it has the ability to sell, and has sold, its ready-mixed concrete products to customers
with their own equipment for the transportation of ready-mixed concrete. When the Supplier sold readymixed concrete products without delivery, it did so at a reduced price compared to ready-mixed concrete
products with delivery.

(D) a delivery charge; or
(E) an installation charge.
3. For purposes of determining the "purchase price" or "sales price" of an item or service, the term
"delivery charge" is defined in Utah Code Annotated Section 59-12-102(24) (2008) as follows:

11. In prior cases in which it found that individuals or entities had made errors in the preparation of
tax returns or sales documents, the Division has allowed those parties or entities to correct errors through
refund requests or amended returns subject to applicable Utah law such as statutes of limitation.
APPLICABLE LAW
1. Utah Code Annotated Section 59-12-103(1)' provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
1
All citations are to the Utah Code Annotated as it existed from July 1,2005 through August 2008.
Although revisions in other subsections caused renumbering of some of the subsections at issue, the
Commission is not aware of any substantive changes to applicable law during the period at issue.

(24) (a) "Delivery charge" means a charge:
(i) by a seller of:
(A) tangible personal property; or
(B) services; and
(ii) for preparation and delivery of the tangible personal property or services
described in Subsection (24)(a)(i) to a location designated by the purchaser,
(b) "Delivery charge" includes a charge for the following:
(i) transportation;
(ii) shipping;
(iii) postage;
(iv) handling;
-3-
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3. The PLR provides that delivery charges for ready-mixed concrete products are exempt from tax if

(v) crating; or
(vi) packing.

the delivery charge is "separately stated on the invoice." The PLR does not extend to delivery charges that
are not separately stated on the invoice,

DISCUSSION
The Taxpayer notes, correctly, that Utah taxpayers have the right and the ability to correct errors in

4. To the extent that del ivery charges such as fuel surcharges and truck waiting time were "separately

tax filings. Amended returns and refund requests are two avenues for the correction of errors. The Taxpayer

stated on an invoice, bill of sale, or similar document provided to the purchaser," they are not subject to sales

characterizes the inclusion of delivery costs on invoices Without separate identification of those delivery costs

tax.

as errors. The problem with characterization of these actions and their invoicing was that the Taxpayer did

5. To the extent that delivery charges from Supplier were not "separately stated on an invoice, bill of

not present evidence to indicate that, at the time of the transactions, the Taxpayer or the Supplier intended to

sale, or similar document provided to the purchaser," they became part of a transaction for delivered goods.

enter into transactions for products other than delivered concrete as documented in the original invoices from

Transactions for the times at issue in this case were, at the time of the Taxpayer's refund request, completed

the Supplier to the Taxpayer. The Supplier provided invoices for delivered Products and did so for a period

transactions.

of more than two years. Fuel surcharges, on the other hand, were separately computed and Supplier generally
charged no tax on these amounts. The Taxpayer paid those invoices without requesting a change in the terms

6 The provisions of Utah law allowing for the correction of errors do not allow the Taxpayer to
change completed transactions for delivered goods into sales of goods plus delivery charges.

of the transactions. Later, when the Taxpayer discovered that it would have received tax savings if it has
structured its transactions differently, ii sought io have the Supplier amend its invoices 10 show separate
delivery charges.

7. Because the Division has not responded to the Taxpayer's refund request for the period from the
end of April 2008 through August 9,2008, there is currently no pending appeal with regard to that period.
However, in the absence of a material difference in facts, the reasoning of this order should apply to all open

The best evidence of the intent of the Taxpayer and the Supplier in their transactions comes from

periods.

invoices that were contemporaneous with those transactions. The Taxpayer had not provided any contract

DECISION AND ORDER

that would indicate that the terms of the transactions were as reflected in those invoices. Because the

On the basis of the foregoing, the Tax Commission orders the Division to make sales tax refunds to

transactions were as the parties intended them at the time, tax on delivery charges not separately listed on

the extent that those delivery charges were separately identified on invoices from the Supplier to the

invoices would be the correct tax rather than an overpayment of tax. The Supplier had sufficient records to

Taxpayer. As to delivery charges that were included in the sales price without separate identification on

show that it could have accurately identified delivery costs. On that basis, it was willing to provide new

invoices, bills of sale, or similar documents provided to the Taxpayer, the Commission sustains the actions of

invoices to identify those delivery charges. However, it did not provide any evidence to show that :h*

the Division in denying the Taxpayer's refund request It is so ordered.
DATED this
HT
day of _
k[\/Ky<^r

transactions at issue were for other than delivered concrete or that there was any error in r

.2009.

_.

originally prepared and as originally paid=
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Utah Code Annotated Section 59-12-103(1) provides for a tax on the retail sales of tangible

Clinton Jensen ,'
Administrative Law Judge ,...-•••*'

personal property made within the state.
2. Utah Code Annotated Section 59-12-102(72)(2008) defines the terms "purchase price** and "sales
price," to exclude, "if separately stated on an invoice, bill of sale, or similar document provided to the
purchaser... a delivery charge."
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Certificate of Mailing
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Ivory Homes/Jack B Parson Co vs Taxpayer Services Division

BY ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION:
The Commission has reviewed this case and the undersigned concur in this decision.
DATED this

Pam Hendrickson
Commission Chair

^

day of

f \ l ^ o t

„**

R Bruce Johnson
Commissioner

M '*•\' S E A L *
Marc B. Jo)
Commii

, 2009.

1

$ ®&>^AiL0Y\
D'Arcy Dixon Pj^nalielli
Commissioner \ J

Notice of Appeal Rights: You have twenty (20) days after the date of this order to file a Request for
Reconsideration with the Tax Commission Appeals Unit pursuant to Utah Code Ann% 63-46b-l3. A Request
for Reconsideration must allege newly discovered evidence or a mistake of law or fact. If you do not file a
Request for Reconsideration with the Commission, this order constitutes final agency action. You have thirty
(30) days after the date of this order to pursue judicial review of this order in accordance with Utah Code
Ann. Sections 59-1-601 and 63-46b-13 et. seq.

David Crapo
Wood Craoo LLC
60 E South Temote #500
Salt Lake City. UT 84111

Attorney for Petitioner

Dee Talbot
Director of Taxpayer Services
210 North 1950 West
Salt Lake Citv. UT 84134

Respondent

Ivory Homes
Jack B Parson Co
978WoodoakLN
S L C U T 84117

Petitioner

Susan Barnum
160 East 300 South. 5th Floor
Salt Lake Citv. UT 84114

Attorney for Respondent
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PETITIONER, Petitioner, v. CUSTOMER SERVICE
DIVISION OF THf UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,
STATE OF UTAH, Respondent.
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Docket/Court: 97-1238, Utah State Tax Commission

Date Issued: 02/26/1999
T a x Type(s): Sales and Use Tax
For Petitioner:
For Respondent: Brian L. Tarbet, Assistant Attorney General

OPINION
P r e s i d i n g : Richard B. McKeown, Chairman

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND FINAL
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

•&

This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission ("Tax Commission") for a
Formal Hearing on July 7, 1998. Chairman Richard B. McKeown heard the matter for and
on behalf of the Tax Commission. ATTORNEYS Petitioner PETITIONER ("PEnTIONER").
Brian L Tarbet, Assistant Attorney General, represented Respondent Customer Service
Division of the Utah State Tax Commission (^Customer Service Division"). Having
considered the evidence presented at the formal hearing, the memoranda, pleadings on
file, and the arguments of respective counsel, the Tax Commission now enters its
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Final Decision.

FINDINGS OF FACT

®J
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1. The tax In question Is Sales and Use T a x ,
2. O n June 26, 1997, PETITIONER filed a Request for Agency Action by Way of
Declaratory Judgment and Request for Refund of sales taxes paid to vendors for
certain purchases of services and tangible personal property related to the 1996
'"expansion" of Its cement plant near Leamington, Utah (Hthe Leamington
facility").
3. PETITIONER is a S T A T E Corporation whose principal place of business is In CITY
S T A T E . PETITIONER operates five cement manufacturing facilities in the western
United States, one of which is near CITY, Utah, located on A D D R E S S .
4. Increasing demand in markets served by PETITIONER CITY facility prompted
PETITIONER to develop and construct a substantially larger cement manufacturing
plant. The expanded facility has increased capacity by approximately 2 5 % .
5. The machinery and equipment currently In use at the CITY facility did not need
replacement. In fact, the CITY facility was only sixteen years old and still In the
early stages of economic life. The equipment was properly maintained and was
expected to operate successfully well Into the future.
6. On January 19, 1996, COMPANY and PETITIONER entered into a contract by
which COMPANY would design and build PETITIONER expanded CITY facility.
7. Expansion of PETITIONER CITY facility began o n or about March 1, 1996 and
was substantially completed by July 1, 1996, except for further modification and
warranty responsibilities.
8. T h e manufacture of cement primarily involves the extracting, crushing,
grinding and blending of R E S O U R C E and other raw materials into a chemically
proportioned mixture which is then processed in a MACHINE to produce a n
Intermediate product called P R O D U C T . " The PRODUCT is cooled and ground with a
relatively small amount of R E S O U R C E to produce finished cement.
9. Both before and after the expansion, the CITY facility incorporated the more
fuel efficient "dry process" technology. In M A C H I N E , the most modern application
of this technology, the raw materials a r e processed through a M A C H I N E that
utilizes R E S O U R C E from the MACHINE to effect partial P R O C E S S o f the raw
materials before they enter the MACHINE.
10. The following is a description of additions or changes to the CITY facility made
during Its expansion in 1 9 9 6 :
a. Increased capacity of the MACHINE by converting the first compartment to a
more efficient S Y S T E M .
b. Installed a new S Y S T E M in the LOCATION to improve fuel efficiency and to
increase the amount of product P R O C E S S E D .
c. C O N V E R T E D O N E M A C H I N E T O ANOTHER, and enlarged PART, to allow
additional R E S O U R C E S to flow through the MACHINE without increasing the
RESULT T R O U G H T H E M A C H I N E .
d . Installed PARTS to cool R E S O U R C E S as they leave the M A C H I N E .
e. Installed a n PART directly after the PART, to induce O F ADDITIONAL PRODUCT.
f. Installed more efficient MACHINE and M A C H I N E .
g . Installed a PART in the existing MACHINE to increase the capacity of the PLACE
to keep pace with the increased fuel d e m a n d of the P R O C E S S .
h. Converted the S Y S T E M to an indirect system by addition of a new PART in
series with the PLACE. This allowed P R O D U C E from the PLACE to be separated
from the PRODUCT, A N D P R O C E S S E D IN A DIFFERENT WAY.
I. Modified the S Y S T E M to handle the increased volume of P R O D U C T . Install
higher capacity units for the two MACHINES.
j . Modified the SYSTEM to handle the additional MACHINE feed.
k. Installed a S Y S T E M o n the existing raw mill t o reduce P R O C E S S . Again, this
allowed P R O C E S S T O E X P A N D .
I. Modifications included piling foundations for the P L A C E , P L A C E , and several
towers for the S Y S T E M , a new tower for the S Y S T E M , new supports for the

tertiary PART, three new towers for the S Y S T E M and major modifications to the
existing PLACE, to support the NEW P R O C E S S .
m . Installed a SYSTEM for the existing control s y s t e m . This involved installing the
PART throughout the plant, installing new operator stations in the control r o o m ,
and installing specially designed software to automate much of the plant
operations. A key component of this s y s t e m is PART, which when properly tuned,
is able to operate major areas of the plant for extended periods of time with
minimal operator input.
11. The CITY facility produces Portland cement. Classification 3241 of the
Standard Industrial Classification Manual describes cement manufacturing
facilities as *[e]stablishments primarily engaged in manufacturing hydraulic
cement, Including portland, natural, masonry and pozzolana cements."

APPLICABLE LAW
1. In November 1996, the Legislature a m e n d e d and renumbered Utah Code Ann.
6 59-12-104(161 . which exempts certain manufacturing equipment from the
sales and use tax. In addition, the Legislature gave this amended statute a n
effective date of July 1, 1995. Accordingly, it is this amended statute that applies
to PETITIONER February, 1996, through July, 1996, purchases of tangible
personal property to "expand" its cement operations. The amended Section 5912-104(16) provided the following exemptions:
(a) the following purchases or leases b y a manufacturer on or after July 1, 1995:
(I) machinery and equipment:
(A) used in the manufacturing process;
(B) having an economic life of three or more years; and
(C) used:
(!) to manufacture an item sold as tangible personal property; and
(II) in new or expanding operations in a manufacturing facility in the state; and
(li) subject to the provisions of Subsection (15)(b), normal operating
replacements that:
(A) have an economic life of three or more years;
(B) are used in the manufacturing process in a manufacturing facility in the state;

(C) are used to replace or adapt an existing machine to extend the normal
estimated useful life of the machine; and
(D) do not include repairs and maintenance;
(b) the rates for the exemption under Subsection (15)(a)(il) are as follows:
(i) beginning July 1, 1996, through June 3 0 , 1997, 3 0 % of the sale or lease
described In Subsection (I5)(a)(li) is e x e m p t ;
(li) beginning July 1, 1997, through June 3 0 , 1998, 6 0 % of the sale or lease
described in Subsection (15)(a)(li) is e x e m p t ; and
(iii) beginning July 1, 1998, 100% of the sale o r lease described in Subsection
(15)(a)(ii) is exempt;
(c) for purposes of this subsection, the commission shaii by rule define the terms
"new or expanding operations" and "establishment"; . . .
2. T o administer the manufacturing equipment exemption of Section 59-12-104,
the Commission has defined the terms "machinery," "equipment," "new or
expanding operations" and "normal operating replacements" in Utah Admin. Code
R 8 6 5 - 1 9 S - 8 5 . Subsequent to the Legislature's 1996 amendment to this
exemption, Rule R865-19S-85 was also a m e n d e d . However, the amended rule did
not have a n effective date until August 2 1 , 1997. Accordingly, the amended rule
is not applicable to PETITIONER 1996 purchases. T h e rule In effect during the
February, 1996 to July, 1996, period in which PETITIONER "expanded" its cement
operations provided the following:
A . Definitions:
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1. "Machinery" means electronic or mechanical machines
incorporated into a manufacturing or assembling process from the
initial stage where actual processing begins, through the
completion of the finished end product, and including final
processing, finishing, or packaging of articles sold as tangible
personal property. This definition includes automated material
handling and storage machinery when that machinery is part of the
integrated continuous production cycle.
2. "Equipment" means any Independent device separate from any
machinery but essential to an integrated or continuous
manufacturing or assembly process or'any subunlt comprising a
component of any machinery or auxiliary thereof, including such
Items as dies, jigs, patterns, molds, and similar Items used in
manufacturing, processing, or assembling. Qualifying equipment
also includes devices necessary to the control or operation of
machinery and equipment qualifying under this rule even though
not located in the specific manufacturing area.
3. (a) "New or expanding operations'* means manufacturing,
processing, or assembling activities that:
(1) are substantially different In nature, character, or purpose from prior
activities;
(2) are begun in a new physical location in Utah; or
(3) increase production or capacity.
(h) The definition of new or expanding operation Is subject to
limitations dealing with normal operating replacements.

6. 'Normal operating replacements' means machinery or
equipment that replaces existing machinery or equipment of a
similar nature, even if the use results in increased plant production
or capacity.
(a) If new machinery or equipment that is purchased or leased has the same or
similar purpose as machinery or equipment retired from service within twelve
months before or after the purchase date, that new machinery or equipment is
considered as replacement and is not exempt.
(b) If existing machinery or equipment is kept for back-up or infrequent use, any
new, similar machinery or equipment that is purchased is considered as
replacement and is not exempt.
7. "Improvement" is defined in Section 59-2-102(11).
B. The machinery and equipment exemption applies only to tangible personal
property. It does not apply to real property or to tangible personal property that
is purchased and becomes an Improvement to real property. The exemption does
not apply to charges for labor to repair, renovate, or dean machinery or
equipment.
C. Machinery or equipment used for an activity that is not part of the
manufacturing process is not exempt. Examples of nonexempt activities Include:

1. research and development;
2. refrigerated or other storage of raw materials, component parts, or finished
product; or
3. shipment of the finished product.

3. An exemption from sales and use tax on certain purchases associated with
pollution control facilities is found in Utah Code Ann. § S9-12-104(12)(1996) ,
which provides an exemption for "sales or use of roperty, materials, or services
used In the construction of or incorporated In pollution control facilities allowed by
Sections 19-2-123 through 19-2-127."
4. Utah Code Ann. S 59-12-103( tf (19961 lists those transactions on which sales
and use tax is Imposed. Among these taxable transactions are those of Subsection
59-12-103(l)(g), which include "services for repairs or renovations of tangible
personal property or services to install tangible personal property in connection
with other tangible personal property."
5. Utah Admin. Code R865-19S-58(B) provides that *[t]he sale of real property is
not subject to sales tax, nor is the labor performed on real property. For example,
the sale of a completed home or building is not subject to the tax, but sales of
materials and supplies to contractors for use in building the home or building are
taxable transactions as sales to final consumers."

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Prior to the expansion of the CITY facility, PETITIONER had advised the Auditing Division
that it would pay sales and use tax on all purchases in connection with the expansion as
If the project were fully taxable, then request a refund for all taxes paid on nontaxable
and exempt transactions. In its subsequent refund request, PETITIONER seeks a refund
of sales and use taxes paid on three types of purchases in connection with the expanse
of the CITY facility.
The first type of purchases are for professional services, which PETITIONER claim <
not taxable under Utah Code Ann. 6 59-12-103(11. Included as professional servic
engineering and project management services. The second type of purchases are f
labor used In connection with the installation and conversion of tangible personal
property to real property, also pursuant to Section 59-12-103(1).
The third type of purchases on which refunds are requested are for machinery and
equipment purchases that qualify either under the manufacturing exemption of yjaJi
Code Ann. 6 59-12-104f 161 and/or the pollution control exemption of Utah Code Ann. 5
59-12-104(121 . Several subissues have arisen and must also be addressed concerning
the purchases of this machinery and equipment. Specifically, PETITIONER has requested
the refund of sales and use tax paid on materials incorporated into certain large
structures, which Respondent claims should be characterized not as machinery and
equipment, but as real property. Another issue Is whether certain Items are used in
activities that are not part of the manufacturing process and thus ineligible for the
manufacturing equipment exemption.
Exhibit P-Uvesay-4 provides a list of all transactions associated with the expansion
project. These transactions are separated into the three types of purchases for which
PETITIONER is requesting a refund of taxes. Under its contract with Fuller, PETITIONER
was separately invoiced for each type of purchase it made from Fuller. We shall
separately address each of these types of purchases and the additional issues raised.
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I. Professional Services
Sales and use taxes are levied upon the purchaser for "sales of tangible personal
property," including 'repairs and renovations of tangible personal property or services to
install tangible personal property in connection with other tangible property." Utah Code
Ann. S 59-12-103m (1996). At question Is whether various professional charges
incurred by PETITIONER during its expansion are taxable under this statutory language.

Utah Admin. Code R865-19S-58(B) provides that "the sale of a completed home [, real
property,] Is not subject to the [sales and use] tax, but sales of materials and supplies [,
tangible personal property,] to contractors and subcontractors are taxable transactions to
final consumers." Necessarily excluded from taxation, therefore, is real property contract
labor. Accordingly, charges for labor to convert tangible personal property to real
property are not subject to sales and use tax, and to the extent that Ash Grove has paid
taxes on such charges, these taxes should be refunded.
However, PETITIONER offers an alternative argument at the hearing, claiming that
Exhibit P-Livesay-4 should be amended to remove all charges currently in Column 2 (for
those items that were converted from tangible personal property to real property) and
transfer them to Column 3 (for items that remained tangible personal property).
PETITIONER wishes to Identify these Items as having remained tangible personal property
Instead of having become real property. Such a move might benefit PETITIONER because
charges for items that remain tangible personal property and the labor to install these
Items may both be exempt from taxes under the manufacturing equipment exemption of
Section 59-12-104(16). Should the tangible personal property Instead be identified as
having been converted to real property, only the labor is nontaxable (because Utah
Admin. Code R865-19S-85(B) states that the manufacturing equipment exemption does
not apply to real property or to tangible personal property that is purchased and becomes
an improvement to real property).
PETITIONER argues that the items it originally designated in Column 2 as having been
converted to real property are not really buildings, but are Instead structures In support
of the tangible personal property. These items Include concrete foundations, structural
steel and pilings that are put into place to support the machinery and equipment.
Testimony is offered that when machinery and equipment are capitalized, the structures
that support them are also capitalized because the structures are usually destroyed
should the equipment be removed.
The majority of the charges in Column 2 relate to a silo that is used to store the finished
cement prior to shipment. There is no chemical transformation of the cement after it
arrives at the silo, and it is unlikely that the silo could be moved as it has a diameter of
80 feet and is over 150 feet tall. PETITIONER argues that the new silo is needed because
of the Increased outDut of the expanded facility and is a necessary component of the
production process because a portion of the finished cement would be "lost" were a
storage facility unavailable. PETITIONER also points out it depreciates the silo in the
same manner as it does other manufacturing equipment.

II. Labor on Persona! Property Converted to Real
Property
PETITIONER contract with Fuller anticipated that NAME would act as a "builder" and
convert certain tangible personal property into real property. Charges for labor, with
respect to converting the tangible personal property to real property, have been
separately identified in NAME'S invoices to PETITIONER. In Exhibit P-livesay-4, these
charges are found in Column 2-Labor. PETITIONER has paid sales and use tax on these
specific labor charges and asks that these taxes be refunded.

In Morton Int% Inc. v. Utah State Tax ComnVn, 163 Utah Adv. Rep. 34 , 914. P-?d 59L,
(Utah 1991), the Utah Supreme Court was confronted with a similar issue as to whether
tangible personal property was converted to real property or remained tangible personal
property for purposes of the manufacturing equipment exemption. In that case, Morton
argued that the shells of its production facilities functioned as equipment by preventing,
localizing, and directing accidental explosions, preventing toxic exposure to workers and
the environment, providing structural support for specialized pieces-of machinery, and
providing access to machinery. The Commission rejected this argument, determining that
the facilities constituted real property not subject to the manufacturing equipment
exemption. The Supreme Court declined to disturb the Commission's ruling.
The facility shells in Morton Int't served a similar support function for equipment as does
the steel, concrete, and pilings that PETITIONER has installed to support its equipment.
In both cases, these items were attached to the land and have become real property. As
to the silo, Its size and method of attachment to the ground leads us to believe it is real
property, also. For these reasons, we confirm PETITIONER original characterization of
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these items as tangible personal property converted to real property. We do not believe
these structures to be equipment, and, thus, they are ineligible for the manufacturing
equipment exemption of Section 59-12-104(16). Accordingly, as we have determined
that these structures, including the silo, are real property, any Invoiced charges for labor
to convert the tangible personal property to real property are nontaxable charges and
should be refunded to the extent PETITIONER has paid sales and use tax on them.
One additional point should be addressed concerning the silo. Had we concluded that the
silo was equipment, it still would not have qualified for the manufacturing equipment
exemption because it is used for an activity outside the manufacturing process. Rule
RB6S-19S-85(C) states that machinery or equipment used for an activity that is not part
of the manufacturing process does not qualify for the exemption. The rule lists, as an
example of equipment outside the production process, equipment used in the storage of
finished product. It is clear that PETITIONER delivers its finished product, cement, to the
new silo and that the silo is not used to process the cement. Not only Is the silo real
property instead of equipment, but its use is outside the cement's manufacturing process.
For both these reasons, the silo does not qualify for the manufacturing equipment
exemption.

III. Tangible Personal Property
PETITIONER asks for a refund of sales and use taxes paid on purchases of tangible
personal property that remained tangible personal property after its installation.
PETITIONER indicates that two exemptions apply to the purchase of these items, the
manufacturing exemption of Section 59-12-104(16) and/or the pollution control
exemption of Section 59-12-104(12). The transactions that relate to this portion of the
refund request are listed in Column 3 of Exhibit P-Uvesay-4.

A. Manufacturing Equipment Exemption
In November, 1996, the Legislature amended the manufacturing equipment exemption of
Section 59-12-104(16), retroactive to July 1, 1995. The amended statute allowed an
exemption for machinery and equipment with an economic life of three or more years if
purchased or leased by a manufacturer in new or expanding operations and used in the
manufacturing process to manufacture an item sold as tangible personal property. The
version of this statute in effect prior to July 1, 1995 and the amended statute both
required the Tax Commission to define the term "new or expanding operations" in rule *
purposes of the manufacturing exemption.
Prior to July 1, 1995, the t a x Commission, in fulfillment of its statutory o\«f v, no
the term "new or expanding operations" in Rule R865-19S-85 ("Rule S 3 ) . wn:c
remained unchanged during the period P b i i u O N E R expanded its CfTr facility. follows:
A.3.(a) "New or expanding operations" means manufacturing, processing.
or assembling activities that:
(1) are substantially different in nature, character, or purpose from prior
activities;
(2) are begun in a new physical location in Utah* or
(3) increase production or capacity.

(b) The definition of new or expanding operation is subject to limitations
dealing with normal operating replacements.
Subpart (A)(3)(b) of the above definition bars any machinery or equipment that qualifies
as normal operating replacements from also qualifying as machinery or equipment used
in new or expanding operations. Rule 85 defines the term "normal operating
replacements" as follows:
A.6. 'Normal operating replacements' means machinery or equipment that
replaces existing machinery or equipment of a similar nature, even if the
use results In increased plant production or capacity.
If any machinery or equipment constitutes "normal operating replacements,* analysis of
whether that machinery or equipment meets the definition of new or expanding
operations in Subpart (A)(3)(a) is unnecessary.
The rule, on its face, would appear to preclude any "replacement* from qualifying for the
exemption, regardless of the purpose of the replacement. For example, a taxpayer that
replaces a state-of-the-art widget maker because it can produce only 100 widgets an
hour would be denied an exemption for an otherwise similar machine purchased only
because it can produce 10,000 widgets an hour. This application has the virtue of
simplicity and may be consistent with guidance this Commission has given to the Auditing
Division in the past. 2 We now believe, however, that this application is unduly narrow. In
interpreting the statute, we have the duty to give effect to all of Its terrnss The statute
does not exclude all "replacements." It excludes "normal operating replacements" which
is clearly a narrower term. See Eaton Kenway v. Auditing Division, 906 P.2d 882. 887
(1995) .
The new machinery and equipment replaces other machinery and equipment of
a simitar nature. We determine that the new equipment that PETITIONER purchased for
its 1996 expansion "replace[d] existing machinery and equipment of a similar nature"
even though those replacements resulted in increased plant production or capacity.
PETITIONER counsel concedes that the nature and character of the cement facility after
the expansion is similar to the prior facility and that the purpose of the facility is the
same prior to and after the expansion. We do not disagree with the counsel's conclusion.
The plant produced cement both before and after the expansion. The new machinery and
equipment replaced machinery and equipment of a similar nature, character, and
purpose. For example, an existing coal system was converted to an indirect system by
addition of a new dust collector so the moist gases could be vented, and existing kiln
units received an upgrade with higher capacity units. Even though this new equipment
increased PETITIONER productivity, it did not change the basics of cement production.
For these reasons, we agree that the new machinery and equipment replaced existing
machinery or equipment of a similar nature. a
T h e s e replacements are not "normal operating replacements." We have found that
the new machinery and equipment is similar in nature to the old equipment that was
retired and thus qualifies as "replacement" equipment. To determine If these
replacements qualify for the exemption, however, we must determine whether they are
"normal operating replacements" within the meaning of the statute.
The Utah Supreme Court, in Eaton Kenway, has determined that replacement equipment
purchased pursuant to a significant modernization and plant upgrade may constitute
"normal operating replacements." In that case, the Court held (Ibid):
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After examining the exemption we do not agree with Eaton and Amid that
it should apply broadly to manufacturers upgrading and modernizing
existing machinery and equipment... Modernizing and upgrading
machinery and equipment are normally done in the regular course of
business even though the replaced Items may be in good working order
.... notably, the statute does not simply deny the exemption to normal
operating replacements - but "normal operating replacements ... even
though they may increase plant production or capacity. * Utah Code
Ann. S 59-12-104(15^ (emphasis added). This language indicates that the
legislature intended to deny the exemption to purchases of replacements
normally made in the regular course of business even though through
advanced technology the replacement machinery and equipment are more
efficient and productive.
See also Newspaper Agency Corp. v. Auditing Division, 938 P.2d 266 (1997) .
Eaton Kenway provides that replacements purchased to modernize existing facilities or
maintain a competitive advantage are made in the "regular course of business" and are
normal operating replacement, even if they increase production. Upgrades are often
necessary in business to meet stricter federal or state guidelines, to replace obsolete
equipment, or just to remain competitive. Such upgrades or modernizations are in the
"regular course of business" because they maintain a business's current production
potential and competitive position or allow the business to adapt to new market
variables, such as stricter pollution level guidelines. This type of upgrade is made in the
"regular course of business" even if increased production is a secondary result.
On the other hand, upgrades that have little purpose other than to increase production
are an expansion of a business, not the regular course of business. In such an instance,
the business is not maintaining its current production potential and competitive position
or adapting to variable market conditions, but is upgrading primarily to increase
production. It is these types of upgrades that we feel are expansionary replacements, not
normal operating replacements.
What stands out in the long list of equipment replaced at PETITIONER is the fact that the
new machine™ and e"ui n ment almost 3twaws had s larger C3 n scit" than the c!d
machinery and equipment. While the Respondent argues that the changes were aimed at
simply upgrading equipment to a more technologically advanced and convenient process,
we do not believe this was a major goal or result of the upgrade. While some of the new
equipment may be more technologically advanced than the previous equipment, that was
not the purpose for the expansion. There is little or no evidence that efficiency was
improved by the new equipment or that pollution levels dropped because of the new
equipment. In fact, the CITY facility was already the most efficient plant that PETITIONER
owned, even prior to the expansion. Nor is evidence offered that efficiency or pollution
level concerns even precipitated or influenced the expansion decision.
Instead, the testamentary evidence overwhelmingly shows that PETITIONER reconfigured
its cement manufacturing plant primarily, If not solely, in order to increase its production
capacity. P t m i O N E R was not seeking to modernize or update its machinery and
equipment In its old plant. In fact, the machinery and equipment in the plant were
working normally and properly at full potential capacity and would have continued to do
so for many years in the future. PETITIONER reconfigured Its plant for one reason - to
increase production capacity. Documentary evidence supports the fact that PETITIONER
production capacity has Increased approximately 25 percent because of the expansion.
PETITIONER did not just "upgrade" or "modernize" Its plant. It added or replaced
machinery and equipment at its CITY plant to increase its production capacity.

Accordingly, PETITIONER 1996 expansion is not a substitution normally made In the
regular course of business. The goal and result were not to increase the plant's efficiency,
or modernize or upgrade the equipment. The goal and result both were to enable
PETITIONER to produce more cement. PETITIONER upgrades were primarily, if not solely,
for expansionary purposes. Therefore, we find PETITIONER purchases of machinery and
equipment for its 1996 expansion were not made in the "regular course of business," and
thus are not normal operating replacements.
Because the machinery and equipment are not "normal operating replacements," we
need to analyze whether the equipment qualifies for use in "new or expanding
operations" as outlined in subpart (A)(3)(a) of the rule. This subpart lists three activities
that qualify purchases as "new or expanding operations." As the three activities are listed
disjunctively, the existence of any one of the three activities Is sufficient to result in a
"new or expanding operations" designation. It is clear from the facts that PETITIONER
1996 expansion at the CITY facility did Increase its production of cement and Its capacity
to produce cement. Accordingly, the PETITIONER purchases of machinery and equipment
for the 1996 expansion are in "new or expanding operations" in a manufacturing facility
in the state, a requirement of Section S9-12-104(16)(a).
PETITIONER is also a manufacturer of cement, the purchases are for machinery and
equipment that have an economic life of three years or more and are used in the
manufacturing process to manufacture tangible personal property (cement) for sale. No
evidence Is given to suggest otherwise. Thus, PETITIONER'S 1996 expansion of Its CITY
facility meets ail the requirements necessary to qualify its purchases of machinery and
equipment for the manufacturing equipment exemption for "new or expanding
operations."

B. Pollution Control Exemption
PETITIONER also requests that some of the purchases pertaining to the 1996 expansion
of the CITY facility may be exempted from taxation under Section 59-12-104(12), which
allows a sales and use tax exemption on the purchase "of property, materials, or services
used in the construction of or incorporated in pollution control facilities allowed by
Sections 19-2-123 through 19-2-127." Wflh Code Ann, 5 19-2-123(2) provides that a
facility may receive the pollution control exemption oniy upon obtaining a certification of
pollution control from the Department of Environmental Quality. As the CITY facility has
not been certified as a pollution control facility by the Department of Environmental
Quality, the pollution control exemption is not available.

DECISION AND ORDER
Based uoon the foregoing, the Tax Commission finds that PETITIONER purchases of
professional services are taxable or exempt in part (depending upon the taxability of the
underlying equipment) and nontaxable in part. PETITIONER should receive a refund of
taxes paid on the exempt and nontaxable purchases of professional services.
Also, PETITIONER should receive a refund of taxes paid on labor to convert tangible
personal property to real property. Lastly, the machinery and equipment purchased to
expand the CITY facility qualify as new or expanding operations and are thus eligible for
the full manufacturing equipment exemption. Thus, PETITIONER should receive a refund
of taxes paid on this "new or expanding" machinery and equipment. However,
PETITIONER does not qualify for any refund of taxes pursuant to the pollution control
exemption. It is so ordered.
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DATED this 26TH day of February, 1999.
Richard B. McKeown
Chairman
R. Bruce Johnson
Commissioner
Pam Hendricksori
Commissioner
Joe B. Pacheco
Commissioner

Because of the November, 1996, amendment to the statute, Rule R865-19S-85 was
also amended. But, the amended rule did not have an effective date until September 21.
1997. Accordingly, the amended rule with an effective date of September 21, 1997, is not
applicable to the 1996 purchases for the Leamington facility expansion
Ease of administration is not irrelevant and furthers the important goals of treating
taxpayers equally and allowing them to predict the tax consequences of their proposed
actions. Administrative convenience, however, cannot justify a disregard of the words of
a statute.
3.

We do not require any exact matching of individual pieces of equipment. It is sufficient
that Ash Grove's new machinery and equipment, taken as a whole, replaced previous
machinery and equipment of a similar nature. See Eaton Kenway, where a state-of-theart computer numerically controlled machine replaced six manually assisted cutting and
drilling machines.
© 2009 Thomson Reutcrs/WA. Allrightsreserved.
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BEFORE THE STATE TAX COMMISSION OF UTAH
XXXXX
Petitioner,
v.
AUDITING DIVISION OF THE
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,
Respondent

H5i
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:

INFORMAL DECISION

:
:
:

Appeal No. 87-1161
Acct. No. XXXXX

STATEMENT OF CASE
This is an appeal to the Utah State Tax Commissionfroman audit report prepared by tl
Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax Commission (Respondent) for the period XXXXX. A
informal hearing was held on XXXXX in the offices of the Utah State Tax Commission. Davi
J. Angerhofer, Hearing Officer, heard the matter for the Tax Commission. XXXXX, Attorney
Law, represented the Petitioner. XXXXX represented the Respondent. The audit includes sal
and use tax along with penalty and interest assessed on two large jobs which Petitioner compk
in XXXXX. Petitioner sold and installed two gas processing or separating plants, one for
XXXXX and one for XXXXX. Petitioner raised several issues regarding the audit First, the
sales are not subject to Utah sales tax because they were negotiated and consummated in
XXXXX. Petitioner is a nonresident of Utah and has no duty to coiiect saies tax for the state <
Utah. Use tax may be due on the transactions but is properly remitted by the purchasers of the
property, XXXXX. The second issue is whether the installation of the gas processing plants
constitutes an improvement to real property or whether the plant remains personal property.
Labor involved with an improvement to real property is not taxable. Petitioner stated that the
Commission is without authority to distinguish between tangible, personal property which
becomes real property upon installation and tangible, personal property which remains person
property after installation. To exempt installation chargesfromsales tax only if the labor is
separately stated on tangible, personal property which remains personal property after installa
is contrary to a XXXXX letter receivedfroma Tax Commission employee and is contrary to f
Utah Code. The third issue raised by Petitioner is that Utah Code Ann. 59-15-6(4) (1953)
(recodified to59-12-104(15)) exempts sales in excess of $500,000 used in the "new constructs
expansion, or modernization" of any "mine." Oil and gas wells are included in the Utah
definition of "mines," Petitioner claimed further exemptions for tax paid to the state of Wyon
and for tax assessed onfreightcharges. The fourth issue raised by Petitioner concerned the
http.//tax.uiah.gov/re$earch/decistons/J 987/87-1161 .hon (I of 3) (11/21/2007 1:08:13 PM]
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ipropriateness of penalties given the circumstances of this case. Respondent noted that the gas
ant is mounted on skids and is considered personal property for investment tax credit purposes
well as for sales and use tax purposes. Respondent stated that the property is subject to use tax
ice it was purchased for use in the state of Utah. A nonresident vendor is required to collect the
K unless the vendor's only contact is through the mail. Respondent stated that a gas processing
ant is excluded from the exemption set forth in59-12-104(15) because it is a refinery.
FINDINGS
The Tax Commission finds that the sales in question were not consummated in the state of
XXXX but were consummated in Utah at the conclusion of the installation. The sales of the
is processing plants are sales of property subject to Utah sales and use tax. Since Petitioner
stalled the plants, Petitioner had a sufficient nexus with the state of Utah to incur the duty of
Electing the tax. Given that the gas processing plant is mounted on skids, the Tax Commission
ids that the installation of the gas processing plant constitutes the installation of tangible,
irsonal property which is attached to real property but which remains personal property. Tax
ommission Rule R865-51S-1 applies. Installation labor is exempt if separately stated. Since the
stallation labor on the XXXXX was invoiced separately, it is exempt. Petitioner did not
parately invoice the labor for the XXXXX, but provided evidence of the charges for labor,
ofit, and freight at the time of the hearing. Because the XXXXX letter by the Tax Commission
jent did not specify the requirement of separately stating the installation charges and because
stitioner did provide the installation charges at the hearing, the Tax Commission hereby
:empts the installation labor, the profit, and the freight charges for the XXXXX project. Labor
install tangible, personal property to real property is exempt, but labor to install personal
operty in connection with other personal property is taxable pursuant to Rule R865-51S-1.
lthough some of the labor involved in the installation of the gas processing plant constituted
stallation of personal property in connection with other personal property, the Tax Commission
ads that all labor involved with the installation of the gas processing plant ultimately was labor
»r installing tangible, personal property to real property but which remained personal property,
espondent properly applied a tax rate of 5.5 percent to the sales in question. This was the rate
)plicable in XXXXX during the audit period and included the local tax. A credit for XXXXX
x due is properly deducted from the tax due in Utah and not properly deducted from the total
mtract price. The Tax Commission finds sufficient basis on which to waive the penalty in this
atter.
DECISION AND ORDER
Based on the foregoing, it is the decision and order of the Utah State Tax Commission
at Petitioner had the obligation to collect and remit the sales and use taxes to the state of Utah.
tie installation of the gas processing plants constitutes the installation of tangible, personal
operty which is attached to real property but which remains personal property. The labor
larges, freight, and profit as set forth on exhibit A of Petitioner's brief in support of the petition
>r redetermination are properly excluded from sales and use tax. Sales tax paid to the state of
XXXX is properly deducted from the sales and use tax assessed by the state of Utah. Penalty is
ittp^/tax.utah.gov/nscarch/dccision$/1987/87.H6IJilro (2 of 3) (11/21/2007 1:08:13 PM]

hereby abated. The Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax Commission is ordered to adjust i
records in accordance with this decision .
DATED this 25 day of August, 1988.
BY ORDER OF THE STATE TAX COMMISSION OF UTAH.
R. H. Hansen
Roger O. Tew
Chairman
Commissioner
Joe B. Pacheco
Commissioner Commissioner

G. Blaine Davis
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PETITIONER. PeUtioner. v. AUDITING DIVISION OF THE UTAH STATE TAX
COMMISSION. Respondent.
Appeal No. 04-0900; Account No. ####*
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION
2005 Utah Tax LEXIS 4
February 8.2005

I'M
Kerry R. Chapman. Administrative Law Judge. Pam Hendricxson. Commission Chair. Palmer DePaulls,
Commissioner. R. Bruce Johnson. Commissioner. Marc B. Johnson, Commissioner
Appearances: For Petitioner. PETITIONER REPRESENTATIVE 1. President: PETITIONER
REPRESENTATIVE 2
For Respondent: RESPONDENT REPRESENTATIVE 1. Assistant Attorney General: RESPONDENT
REPRESENTATIVE 2. from Auditing Division: RESPONDENT REPRESENTATIVE 3, from AudlUng Division;
RESPONDENT REPRESENTATIVE 4. from Auditing Division
OPINION:
ORDER
Tax Type: Sales Tax
Audit Period: 7/1/00 - 6730/
Judge: Chapman
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission for an Initial Hearing pursuant to the provisions of Utah
Code Ann. §59-1-502.5. on January 12. 2005.
The Petitioner is In the printing business. Among the items sold by the Petitioner are printed Items and associated
pre-press materials. Pursuant to an audit, Auditing Division ("Division") issued an Amended Statutory Notice of sales
tax liability to the Petitioner, which Petitioner timely appealed. The only portion of the audit assessment at issue
concerns the Petitioner's sales of pre-press materials to its resale customers.

s

The Division [*2] asserts that the Petitioner is liable for sales and use tax on pre-press materials associated with
printed items it sold tax-free to Its resale customers. The Petitioner asserts that Its customers purchased the pre-press
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materials tax-free and that It took the necessary steps to sell them the Hems as such. The Division asserts that the
Petitioner is liable because it did not inform the customers that their purchase included reusable pre-press materials In
accordance with Utah Admin. Code R865-19S-80(B)(3) ("Rule 80"). Without such notice, the Division argues, the
resale customer may believe that It did not purchase pre-press materials on which it may itself be subsequently liable for
tax.

Pursuant to INew Rule 80]. a printer may purchase pre-press materials tax free If the printer's Invoice, or
other written material provided to the purchaser, states that reusable pre-press materials are Included with
the purchase. The statement need not describe the pre-press materials, and may not restrict the purchaser
from taking physical possession of those materials.

The Petitioner believes that It has complied with Rule 80(B)(3) because it provided a written bid sheet to its
customers that Included a line item identifying the cost of the pre-press materials. The Division asserts, however, that
this written bid sheet does not. as required by Rule 80(B)(3)." (state) that reusable pre-press materials are Included In
the purchase." When ownership of the printed Items is transferred at the time of sale, the Petitioner presents an Invoice
with no separate line Itemization (*3j for pre-press materials and no statement such materials are Included in the
purchase. While the Petitioner contends that the bid sheet provides such notice, the Division responds that a resale
customer under these circumstances may not realize that it has purchased prepress materials, instead believing that it Is
reimbursing the Petitioner for Items the Petitioner consumed to produce the printing job.
The Division states that the Petitioner was given an opportunity to contact its customers to have them confirm that
they accepted responsibility for the tax on the pre-press materials under these circumstances. It further states that the
only sales remaining at Issue are those where the customer did not affirmatively accept liability.
APPLICABLE LAW
To administer the taxation of printers and Its sales of pre-press materials, the Tax Commission has adopted Rule 80.
The audit period at Issue is July 1,2000 through June 30,2003. During the audit period, on December iS. 2000. the
Commission amended Rule 80. including those provisions affecting pre-press materials. Prior to this amendment. "Old
Rule 80" provided, in part:

E. Printers may purchase tax free reusable pre-press 1*4] materials . . . used in the preparation of printed
matter for resale provided title to said tangible personal property passes to the customer.
2. The printer's Invoice must contain a statement on its face, diat states that reusable prepress
materials associated with that transaction are included with the purchase. A description and the quantity
of the actual Items used In the order is not necessary. The statement must not restrict the customer from
taking physical possession of those items If so desired.
"New Rule 80" became effective on December 19.2000. Its provides for the taxation of pre-press materials, as
follows:

B.3. A printer may purchase pre-press materials tax free If the printer's Invoice, or other written material
provided to the purchaser, states that reusable pre-press materials are included with the purchase. A
description and the quantity of the actual items used In the order is not necessary. The statement must not
restrict the customer from taking physical possession of the pre-press materials.
Upon the adoption of New Rule 80. Tax Commission Bulletin 16-00 became effective and addressed the sale of
pre-press materials as follows: |*5)
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DISCUSSION
The Division argues that under both Old Rule 80 and New Rule 80. the Petitioner did not provide its resale
customers adequate notice that its tax-free purchases included reusable pre-press materials. The Commission Is aware
that a resale customer who purchases printed items and pre-press materials tax-free for resale does not always sell the
pre-press materials to the final consumer of the printed materials. Under such circumstances, the resale customer should
remit use tax on its consumption of the pre-press materials, but often does not. Both Old Rule 80 and New Rule 80
contain provisions to ensure that a printer provides notice to its resale customers that they have purchased reusable
pre-press materials and, thus, may be liable for tax on the materials.
Old Rule 80. [*6] For those transactions prior to December 19, 2000. the Commission must apply Old Rule 80 to
determine whether the Petitioner Is liable for the taxes assessed by the Division. Section E.2. of Old Rule 80 requires a
printer's Invoice to contain a statement on Its face that reusable pre-press materials associated with the transaction are
included with the purchase. The Petitioner's invoices did not contain such a statement. For this reason, the Petitioner did
not provide adequate notice as required under Old Rule 80. Accordingly, for those sales at issue during the audit period
that occurred prior to December 19, 2000. the Petitioner is liable for tax on the pre-press materials.
New Rule 80. This rule applies to those sales In the audit period occurring on or after December 19.2000. Section
B.3. of New Rule 80.as well as Tax Bulletin 16-00. requires a printer selling pre-press materials tax-free to provide its
resale customers a written document that "states that reusable pre-press materials are Included with the purchase." The
Petitioner provided a written document to its customers, a bid sheet, on which it Itemized the pre-press materials
Incorporated Into the cost of the bid. [*7] However, the information on mis sheet does not distinguish whether the
resale customer is purchasing reusable pre-press materials or only reimbursing the Petitioner for consumed pre-press
materials. Under the latter circumstance, the Petitioner, not the resale customer. Is responsible for sales and use tax on
the pre-press materials. For these reasons, the Commission finds that the Itemization of the pre-press materials on the
bid sheet, without any further explanation, was ot adequate notice to satisfy New Rule 80(B)(3).
The Commission also notes that although taxing statutes are generally construed In favor of the taxpayer and
against the taxing authority, the Utah Supreme Court has held that statutes providing tax exemptions are construed
strictly against the taxpayer. Parson Asphalt Prods., Inc. v. Utah State TaxComm'n, 6l7P.2d397, 398 (Utah 1980).
The issue before the Commission involves a sales tax exemption. For these reasons, the Commission finds titat the
Petitioner is also liable for sales and use tax on its tax-exempt sales of pre-press materials on or after December 19.
2000.
The Petitioner stated that it believed its customers knew [*8) they were purchasing reusable pre-press materials
when they received the bid sheets on which the pre-press materials were listed. The Petitioner was allowed an
opportunity to prove its assertion and contacted its customers for confirmation. Many of its customers confirmed that
they had taken responsibility for the tax associated with the pre-press materials purchased from the Petitioner. The
Division states that it no longer considers the Petitioner liable for these sales. The Commission agrees that the Petitioner
is not liable for the tax on these sales because the resale customers have confirmed that it has notice of Its liability for
die tax. However, for those sales where the resale customer did not confirm that it purchases reusable pre-press
materials from the Petitioner, the Petitioner Is responsible, as discussed earlier.
DECISION AND ORDER
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Based on the foregoing, the Commission finds that the Petitioner is liable for sales and use tax on its sales of
pre-press materials to tax-exempt resale customers, except in those instances where the Petitioner's resale customers
accepted responsibility for the taxes on the prepress materials in writing. It is so ordered.
This decision [*9] does not limit a party's right to a Formal Hearing. However, this Decision and Order will
become the Final Decision and Order of the Commission unless any party to this case flies a written request within
thirty (30) days of the date of this decision to proceed to a Formal Hearing. Such a request shall be mailed to the address
listed below and must include the Petitioner's name, address, and appeal number:
Utah State Tax Commission
Appeals Division
210 North 1950 West
Salt Lake City. Utah 84134
Failure to request a Formal Hearing will preclude any further appealrightsIn this matter.
DATED this

day of .2005.

Kerry R. Chapman
Administrative Law Judge
BY ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION.
The Commission has reviewed this case and the undersigned concur In this decision.
DATED this

day of .2005.
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